Congress’s powers are supposed to be few and defined

Congress’s Powers Are Supposed to Be Few and Defined

The Founders’ Vision of Limited Federal Authority

Congress s powers are supposed to be - The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, in its succinct phrasing, asserts a clear principle: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” This single sentence encapsulates the foundation of American federalism, establishing that state and local governments retain authority over matters not explicitly assigned to the federal government. For decades after the New Deal, this amendment was treated more as a ceremonial clause than a forceful limitation on federal power. Courts largely ignored its implications, allowing Congress to expand its reach without clear constitutional boundaries. However, this trend has begun to reverse over the past thirty years, though the restraints on federal authority remain incomplete.

“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” — James Madison, The Federalist No. 45

Madison’s insight underscores the deliberate design of the Constitution. The Founders envisioned a federal system where the national government’s scope was limited to specific, enumerated functions. By reserving all other powers to the states, they created a balance between centralized governance and local autonomy. This framework was meant to prevent the federal government from overstepping its authority, relying on the ambition of states to act as checks on federal overreach. Yet, the New Deal era marked a turning point, as the courts increasingly interpreted the Commerce Clause broadly, enabling Congress to claim authority over a wide range of activities, even those with minimal economic impact.

The Commerce Clause Expansion and Its Consequences

One of the most pivotal moments in this shift occurred in Wickard v. Filburn (1942), where the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could regulate wheat grown on a private farm for personal consumption. The decision hinged on the argument that such a non-commercial act, when aggregated across the nation, had a cumulative effect on interstate commerce. This ruling effectively allowed federal laws to extend into areas previously considered the domain of state authority, undermining the Tenth Amendment’s role as a constitutional safeguard.

As a result, Congress’s enumerated powers—those explicitly outlined in the Constitution—were overshadowed by the broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Over six decades, this expansion became a norm, with federal agencies and lawmakers wielding authority over issues that had once been local or state concerns. The consequences of this shift were profound, as the balance of power between federal and state governments tilted toward the former. While the courts in Washington largely accepted this expansion, the erosion of state sovereignty went largely unchallenged until recent years.

A New Era of Constitutional Constraints

The past thirty years have seen a gradual reawakening of the Tenth Amendment’s influence. In U.S. v. Lopez (1995), the Supreme Court struck down a federal law regulating firearms near schools, marking the first time in six decades that a Commerce Clause limit was imposed. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 5-4 majority argued that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded congressional power because the act of gun possession near schools did not have a substantial economic impact on interstate commerce. This decision signaled a willingness to reclaim constitutional boundaries and reevaluate the extent of federal authority.

The trend continued with U.S. v. Morrison (2000), which applied similar reasoning to the Violence Against Women Act. The Court ruled that Congress lacked the authority to impose a civil remedy provision on gender-based violence, as it did not sufficiently link the issue to interstate commerce. Then, in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), the Court rejected the Commerce Clause rationale for the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, further narrowing the scope of federal power. More recently, West Virginia v. EPA (2022) introduced the major questions doctrine, requiring Congress to demonstrate clear intent before delegating sweeping regulatory authority to federal agencies.

Another significant development came in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), where the Court overruled Chevron deference—a longstanding principle that allowed agencies to interpret ambiguous statutes in favor of their own regulatory goals. This ruling empowered courts to independently assess the validity of agency actions, restoring a critical check on executive overreach. Collectively, these decisions represent a meaningful shift toward a more constrained federal government, yet they have not fully reversed the legacy of decades of expansive interpretation.

Anti-Commandeering and the Limits of State Autonomy

Among the most practical applications of the Tenth Amendment is the principle of anti-commandeering, which prevents the federal government from compelling state officials to enforce federal laws without their consent. This doctrine was established in Printz v. United States (1997), where Justice Scalia emphasized that the Constitution envisions a government that operates through its own officers, not one that forces state and local authorities to act as instruments of federal policy. The ruling clarified that states retain the right to resist federal mandates in certain circumstances.

Building on this foundation, Murphy v. NCAA (2018) extended the anti-commandeering principle to legislative actions, asserting that Congress cannot dictate the content of state laws. This decision reinforced the idea that state legislatures should not be subordinated to federal interests without clear constitutional justification. The implications of anti-commandeering are particularly evident in issues like immigration policy, where federal laws cannot compel local law enforcement to enforce immigration rules against their will.

However, the doctrine has been misinterpreted in some cases. While it protects states from being forced to serve federal interests, it does not absolve state and local officials of their own responsibilities. For instance, a sheriff who refuses to honor an ICE detainer is not exercising constitutional autonomy; instead, they are making a policy choice based on local priorities. The key question, therefore, is not whether Washington can compel cooperation, but whether local officials can be held accountable for their decisions when they affect the rights of their constituents.

State Autonomy in Practice

The interplay between federal mandates and state autonomy is a recurring theme in contemporary governance. In California, for example, the state has long embraced a model of aggressive regulation in areas where federal standards are weak. When federal requirements become inconvenient, California often invokes its constitutional autonomy to resist them. This duality is evident in the state’s approach to immigration, environmental policy, and public pensions, where federal laws and state initiatives coexist in a complex relationship.

While the Tenth Amendment provides a framework for this balance, its implementation remains contested. Anti-commandeering has been a central tool in this struggle, but its scope is not absolute. States can still exercise their authority to shape policies that reflect their unique needs and values. The recent legal developments, though significant, are part of a broader effort to restore the original intent of the Constitution. As the federal government continues to assert its power, the Tenth Amendment’s role as a constitutional check will remain essential in maintaining the equilibrium between state and federal authority.